Dawood discourse. The debate over the state's treatment of electoral speech is, at heart, a debate about the central values in a democratic system.
In recent years, the debate over electoral speech has become increasingly urgent in light of the considerable resources that are spent during political campaigns. This article intervenes in this debate by re-examining the central distinction between the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach. In particular, this article develops a new normative framework for the regulation of electoral speech and, in so doing, it advances two main claims. First, I argue that although the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is usually presented as a binary choice, the laws of a given jurisdiction often simultaneously display both libertarian and egalitarian characteristics. For this reason, I claim that the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is better conceived of as a "libertarian-egalitarian spectrum." Ideal versions of the libertarian and egalitarian approaches, respectively, serve as the endpoints of the spectrum, while points along the spectrum represent particular combinations of the libertarian and egalitarian approaches.
Second, this article advances the normative claim that democracies should seek to incorporate both the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach within constitutional law. The choice between these two approaches should be understood as a choice between liberty and equality. I argue that instead of emphasizing one value over the other, the ideal position is one that simultaneously recognizes the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tensions between them. Indeed, I claim that the conflict between liberty and equality cannot and should not be resolved or reconciled. Rather than resolving the tension between liberty and equality, I argue that it is vital to maintain this tension by instantiating the conflict in law.
The approach proposed here-that the conflict between liberty and equality should be instantiated in law-stands in some contrast to the conventional approaches to this issue. I claim that the two dominant approaches in the literature seek to reconcile liberty and equality by rendering each value an aspect of the other. The first approach, exemplified by the work of Owen Fiss, transforms equality into an aspect of liberty. Fiss argues that the conflict between liberty and equality can be transformed into a conflict between liberty and liberty. 5 Indeed, the egalitarian approach is based on Fiss' theory that restrictions on electoral speech can be justified on the basis that such restrictions are required in order to promote the freedom of speech. The second approach, exemplified by the work of Ronald Dworkin, transforms liberty into an aspect of equality. Dworkin argues that under his "equality of resources" conception of equality, liberty is simply another resource that ought to be equally distributed. 6 There is no doubt that the arguments of Fiss and Dworkin are compelling. Their approaches shed new light on the complexity of liberty and equality, respectively, and they also provide elegant solutions to an intractable conflict between 5. Owen M Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) fundamental values. Without criticizing the content of either approach, I wish to suggest that there is an unacknowledged cost to converting the campaign finance debate from a choice between liberty and equality to a choice between two understandings of liberty (or two dimensions of equality). Specifically, I claim that there is substantial democratic value to retaining and rendering transparent the irreconcilable tension between liberty and equality. Rather than choosing one value over the other, or reconciling these values by redefining them, I argue that it is essential to instantiate the conflict between these two values in law. The decision to regulate electoral speech should be viewed as inevitably entailing a tradeoff between liberty and equality. Gains in liberty often mean losses in equality, while gains in equality often mean losses to liberty. Democracy is better served when the law contains an explicit tension between these foundational values.
After setting forth the normative framework, I then apply it to the campaign finance decisions of the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada, respectively. 7 A comparative analysis is useful because it sheds light on the complex interplay between constitutional doctrines and their underlying normative principles. I argue, first, that the campaign finance regimes in Canada and the United States are better understood as falling along the libertarian-egalitarian spectrum, rather than as being either egalitarian or libertarian.
Second, I use the normative framework to evaluate the treatment of electoral speech in the United States and Canada. I argue that in recent years the U.S. Supreme Court has over-emphasized the value of liberty, with the result that political equality is markedly undermined. By the same token, the Supreme Court of Canada's commitment to equality has become too one-sided in recent cases, with the result that there are significant impairments to free speech liberties. Both of these approaches are detrimental to democratic participation and governance. Finally, the comparative analysis provides guidance for how electoral speech should be regulated in the future. This article offers a preliminary proposal for how courts and legislatures can incorporate the values of liberty and equality in constitutional law despite the significant tension that exists between these two values.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the theoretical arguments for the libertarian and egalitarian approaches, respectively, and it also sets forth a new normative framework for thinking about the choice between these two approaches. Part II argues for the existence of a libertarian-egalitarian spectrum by examining the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and the U.S. Supreme Court on the regulation of campaign finance. Part III applies the normative framework to evaluate the current state of campaign finance law in Canada and the United States. The article ends with preliminary proposal of how the conflict between liberty and equality can be instantiated in law. 
Dawood

I. Liberty, Equality and the Freedom of Speech
There are two approaches to the regulation of campaign finance regulation in the scholarly literature-the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach, respectively. 8 The libertarian approach, which is the conventional view, regards the state regulation of speech with suspicion. The freedom of speech enables citizens to criticize and contest the government without fear of censorship or reprisal.
9 People communicate ideas by donating money to candidates, parties and other organizations that support their political viewpoints, or by spending money independently on electoral advertising. If the government is able to restrict speech, then it may be tempted to silence speech that is critical of its performance. Democracy and liberty are thus threatened if the government has the power to regulate speech. For this reason, the libertarian approach views any regulation of electoral speech as a violation of this right.
10
The egalitarian approach, by contrast, holds that the government regulation of speech is required in some instances to support the freedom of speech. The argument is that threats to free speech arise not only from state action, but also from private actors.
11 Because the dissemination of viewpoints is expensive, those with the greatest wealth could monopolize the means of communication.
Concentrations of private wealth may mean that the speech of the non-wealthy is never heard, and consequently, that the marketplace of ideas does not represent the full range of views and speakers. For this reason, informed public debate may require that the government restrain certain voices in order to ensure that all points of view have a roughly equal opportunity of being heard. As Cass Sunstein observes, "in some circumstances, what seems to be government regulation of speech actually might promote free speech, and should not be treated as an abridgment at all."
12 Restrictions on campaign finance "promote political deliberation and political equality by reducing the distorting effects of disparities in wealth. On this view, such laws promote the system of free expression by ensuring that less wealthy speakers do not have much weaker voices than wealthy ones."
13 According to the egalitarian approach, the government regulation of speech may promote, rather than infringe, the freedom of speech.
A. Reconciling Liberty and Equality
The debate over the regulation of campaign finance regulation can be understood as raising a fundamental conflict between liberty and equality. I claim that the dominant approach in the scholarly literature, however, has been to reconcile the tension between liberty and equality. I further argue that there are in fact two ways to engage in this reconciliation. The first is to make equality an aspect of 8. Sunstein, supra note 4 at 1-51. 9. Ibid at 8-10. 10. Cass R Sunstein, "Free Speech Now" (1992) 59 U Chi L Rev 255, 259. 11. Fiss, supra note 5 at 2-3. 12. Sunstein, supra note 10 at 267. 13. Ibid at 291. liberty while the second is to make liberty an aspect of equality. The egalitarian approach, notwithstanding its name, is a good example of the first approach. The reconciliation between liberty and equality takes place because equality is transformed into another aspect of liberty. The debate over campaign finance regulation is thus converted from a choice between liberty and equality to a choice between liberty and liberty.
The egalitarian approach is premised on the work of Owen Fiss. Fiss argues that it is difficult, if not impossible, to discover a method of choosing between liberty and equality.
14 He observes, for example, that the regulation of campaign finance "forces the legal system to choose between transcendent commitmentsliberty and equality-and yet the Constitution provides no guidance as to how that choice should be made." 15 Fiss's elegant solution to the "unsolvable battle" between liberty and equality is to recast the regulations of speech as enhancing the freedom of speech.
16 He argues that we should transform the conflict between liberty and equality into a conflict between liberty and liberty. In this way, the problem of regulating speech is placed within a common matrix.
17 He claims that:
The division within liberalism arises not from its pluralistic commitments and inability to prioritize equality and liberty but rather, I maintain, from a dispute over the very meaning of freedom. What is at issue is two different ways of understanding liberty.
18
Fiss argues that we can defend the regulation of speech in the name of liberty because of the silencing dynamic of harmful speech. 19 The regulation of hate speech, pornography and campaign finance is justified on the basis that liberty must be at times curtailed in order to protect vulnerable groups from subordination 20 For example, an absence of campaign finance regulation will mean that the wealthy will dominate the advertising space with the result that the "voice of the less affluent may simply be drowned out." 21 Fiss's theory is based in part on a reconceptualization of the role of the state. The conventional view holds that the state is the enemy of free speech and the individual's right to self-expression must be protected from state interference. Fiss argues that this conventional view of the state is incomplete. Private wealth also poses a threat to the freedom of speech and it therefore must be regulated by the state. On this view, the state regulation of speech is not necessarily threatening to free speech but is instead protective of it against private aggregations of power.
22
He argues that liberalism's commitment to a limited state has been weakened in the face of the need of strong state power to pursue egalitarian objectives. 23 In this way, the state is a friend of free speech because it preserves the possibility of public discussion. The role of the state is to ensure that individuals are aware of the wide diversity of views. Rather than treating the freedom of speech as an individual right, speech is seen here as a public right that enables collective selfdetermination.
24 Under Fiss's reconciliation, the regulation of campaign finance is defended on the basis that it promotes liberty.
The second approach to reconciling the conflict between liberty and equality is to make liberty an aspect of equality. Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality best exemplifies this approach. Dworkin argues for the "equality of resources" conception of distributional equality. Under this understanding of equality, "liberty becomes an aspect of equality, rather than, as it is often thought to be, an independent political ideal potentially in conflict with it." 25 The reconciliation between liberty and equality takes place because equality is understood as an "equality of resources" and liberty is viewed as one of the elements in the bundle of resources.
26 For Dworkin, liberty is subsumed within equality-it is simply another resource that must be equally distributed. Dworkin thus advances a constitutive argument in which "liberty and equality are not independent virtues but aspects of the same ideal of political association." 27 He argues that by declaring "our faith in liberty we are only affirming the form in which we embrace equality."
28 This bridging strategy is based on the idea that liberty and equality are dimensions of a shared political virtue.
29
With respect to the regulation of campaign finance, Dworkin argues that there are many conceptions of liberty and equality so that the existence of a conflict depends upon the particular conceptions of liberty and equality that are adopted. 30 He notes that other jurisdictions do limit election expenditures and this demonstrates that such limits are workable. 31 The refusal to regulate campaign finance involves a "democratic wager" that constraints on electoral speech will likely harm democracy even though such constraints are ostensibly established to improve democracy. 32 Dworkin argues that the regulation of political speech is acceptable when:
.… such legislation does not keep information or argument from the public that would otherwise be available to it, when it is not designed to favor government or to favor any party or ideology or policy over any other, when it does not reflect any assumption about the truth, falsity, danger or offensiveness of any message or display, and when it is likely to improve the democratic character of public political discourse by making participation available to more citizens on an equal footing or by improving the quality of public discourse or both.
33
For Dworkin, the liberty of speech is understood in terms of equality: the public should have access to all information and viewpoints and participation in the public discourse should be available to all. Dworkin's approach is largely consonant with Rawls' view that the "constitution must take steps to enhance the value of the equal rights of participation for all members of society." 34 For Rawls, there must be a "fair opportunity to take part in and to influence the political process."
35 Rawls argues for a principle of equal liberty, which when applied to the political process is understood as a principle of equal participation. 36 The principle of equal participation "requires that all citizens are to have an equal right to take part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes the laws with which they are to comply."
37
B. Rethinking the Conflict Between Liberty and Equality
Although Fiss and Dworkin advance different theories for why electoral speech should be regulated, they are united in their commitment to defuse the tension between liberty and equality. They have adopted parallel approaches: both theorists have redefined the regulation of electoral speech by arguing that different aspects of the same value-liberty for Fiss and equality for Dworkin-are at stake. Fiss and Dworkin have shed new light on the complex structure of liberty and equality, respectively. Not only are their theories nuanced and compelling, but they also provide cogent reasons for why we should regulate campaign finance. The practical import of their theories is that the regulation of electoral speech does not violate either liberty or equality, and to this extent, their theories are compatible with the approach proposed in this article.
It is, of course, possible to wonder whether the reconciliation between liberty and equality is ultimately successful as a theoretical matter. As Richard Moon observes, Fiss wished to avoid the indeterminacy of the conflict between liberty and equality. Moon argues, though, that it is not evident that a conflict between liberty and liberty is any more determinate than the conflict between liberty and equality.
38 Although I agree with Moon's assessment, my objective is not to assess the theoretical cogency of either approach.
Instead, I wish to make the claim that something critical is lost when the problem is presented as one that concerns either liberty or equality. Specifically, I argue that there is substantial democratic value to keeping the conflict between liberty and equality in plain view. The main difficulty with the liberty-liberty reconciliation approach is that it lessens the normative status of equality. For this reason, I suggest that the "egalitarian" approach should be openly based upon the promotion of political equality, rather than being theoretically rooted in the protection of liberty. In a similar way, the equality-equality reconciliation approach lessens the normative status of liberty. It is essential to view liberty as an independent value that is not necessarily protected by equality-centred laws.
Instead of defusing the conflict between liberty and equality, I argue that democracies should seek to instantiate this conflict in law. This would mean, first, that democracies should incorporate both the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach in their treatment of electoral speech. In addition to incorporating both approaches, I claim that we should reframe the conflict as between liberty and equality, and not between two conceptions of liberty (or two conceptions of equality). Furthermore, I claim that we should understand the regulation of electoral speech as inevitably involving a trade-off between liberty and equality. Gains in liberty result in losses to equality, while gains in equality result in losses to liberty. Although it is impossible to fully reconcile these approaches, my claim is that it is vital to maintain the tension between liberty and equality. The ideal position is neither libertarian nor egalitarian; instead, the ideal position is one that seeks to simultaneously recognize the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tensions between them.
II. The Libertarian-Egalitarian Spectrum
Jurisdictions are often described as following either a libertarian or an egalitarian approach to the regulation of electoral speech. Although the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is often presented as a binary one, I argue that the laws of such jurisdictions as Canada and the United States simultaneously display both libertarian and egalitarian characteristics. For this reason, I claim that it is better to think of a given jurisdiction as falling within a libertarian-egalitarian spectrum.
A. Liberty and Equality in the American Approach to Electoral Speech
Although the approach to electoral speech in the United States is usually described as libertarian, the jurisprudence contained a mix of libertarian and egalitarian commitments for many years. This mixed approach is evident in the first major campaign finance decision by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.
39 At issue in Buckley was the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). On the one hand, the Court adopted a libertarian position when it struck down FECA's restrictions on spending on the basis that these limits consisted of direct restraints on speech in violation of the First Amendment. 40 On the other hand, the Court upheld FECA's limits on contributions on the basis that such 39. Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976) . 40. Ibid at 19-20. restrictions prevented the reality and appearance of corruption. Unlimited contributions raise the specter of corruption when they "are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders." 41 It is important to note, however, that in Buckley the Court rejected an equalization (or egalitarian) rationale, stating in a key phrase that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 42 In later decisions, however, it became clear that the Court's anti-corruption rationale had transformed into something close to an equalization rationale. As Kathleen Sullivan observes, the corruption argument "is really a variant on the problem of political equality: unequal outlays of political money create inequality in political representation." 43 Although the Court had not openly embraced the equalization rationale, the understanding of corruption, at least by some of the justices, had broadened into a commitment to "antidistortion," which is at times indistinguishable from the equalization rationale. According to David Cole, the Supreme Court was wrestling with the difficulty that concentrated wealth gives "certain voices inordinate influence, not because of the power of their ideas, but because of the volume they can generate for their voices with dollars earned through commercial activities." 44 In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, for example, the Court observed that the "corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth" 45 may make "a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas. 53 A five-member majority of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of BCRA's soft money and issue advertising provisions. In addition, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Buckley that the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption was the only permissible justification for campaign finance regulations. In what appears to be a departure from Buckley, however, the majority found that corruption did not simply mean "cash-for-votes exchanges," 54 but also encompassed the "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence." 55 According to the Court, undue influence is apparent in the way that political parties have sold access to federal candidates and officeholders. Because the record contained numerous examples of political parties selling access to federal officeholders in exchange for large soft money donations, the Court concluded that Congress was justified in determining that such contributions give rise to the appearance and reality of corruption.
56 Despite its libertarian reputation, the campaign finance jurisprudence in the U.S. had for many years a mix of libertarian and egalitarian commitments.
B. Liberty and Equality in the Canadian Approach to Electoral Speech
In the early years, the Canadian judicial approach to electoral speech was libertarian. Although Parliament enacted limitations on third party spending, 57 lower level courts adopted a libertarian stance by striking down such limits as violations of the Charter's guarantee of free expression. 58 As the term implies, third party spending refers to campaign spending that is by citizens, interest groups, and corporations-in essence all spending that is conducted by individuals or groups that are neither candidates nor political parties.
Once the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the constitutionality of campaign finance, however, the law shifted in a more egalitarian direction. The Supreme 52. McConnell v FEC, 540 US 93 (2003) . 53. Soft money refers to funds that were not subject to FECA's amount limitations and disclosure requirements. Issue advertising could be funded by soft money provided that specific words of support or opposition were avoided. 60 Robert Libman, who was the president of the Equality Party, did not wish to join either the "yes" or the "no" position on the referendum question, and instead wished to advocate in favour of abstaining from the vote. The referendum legislation, however, required that regulated expenses be incurred only through a national committee, which meant that individuals who supported neither option were limited to unregulated expenses. 61 Mr. Libman argued that these restrictions infringed the freedoms of expression and association and the right to equality. 62 He claimed that any individual or group should have the right to receive public funding and to incur regulated expenses.
63
A close examination of the Court's reasoning reveals, I claim, a commitment to both liberty and equality. The Court promoted liberty by striking down the spending rules as limitations on the freedom of expression. 64 It emphasized that freedom of expression is of "crucial importance in a democratic society" 65 and that the "connection between freedom of expression and the political process is perhaps the linchpin of the s. 2(b) guarantee, and [that] the nature of this connection is largely derived from the Canadian commitment to democracy." 66 At the same time, as Colin Feasby has argued, the Court appeared to endorse an egalitarian approach to the freedom of expression. 67 The Court stated that it was important to prevent "the most affluent members of society from exerting a disproportionate influence by dominating the referendum debate through access to greater resources." 68 The Court described the egalitarian aspect of spending limits as follows:
[S]pending limits are essential to ensure the primacy of the principle of fairness in democratic elections. The principle of electoral fairness flows directly from a principle entrenched in the Constitution: that of the political equality of citizens. If the principle of fairness in the political sphere is to be preserved, it cannot be presumed that all persons have the same financial resources to communicate with the electorate.
69
Given the competitive nature of elections, spending limits are required to prevent "the most affluent from monopolizing election discourse and consequently [1997] The Libman case illustrates the idea that constitutional cases can instantiate both the libertarian and the egalitarian approaches to the freedom of expression.
Libman v Quebec (AG)
Although the libertarian and egalitarian approaches are often viewed as presenting a stark choice, the laws of a given jurisdiction often reveal a commitment to both approaches. Until recently, the regulation of campaign finance in the United States displayed a mix of libertarian and egalitarian elements. On the one hand, the Court protected liberty by striking down restrictions on spending by individuals. On the other hand, the Court upheld restrictions on unlimited spending by corporations under an antidistortion rationale that was centrally concerned with equality. In a similar way, the Supreme Court of Canada's approach in the Libman case had a mix of libertarian and egalitarian features. In sum, a close examination of the campaign finance regimes in Canada and the United States reveals that the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is better conceived as a libertarian-egalitarian spectrum because a given jurisdiction's laws at any given time often contain a mix of libertarian and egalitarian elements.
III. Liberty, Equality and the Law
The concept of the libertarian-egalitarian spectrum captures the idea that it is possible for the law to promote both equality and liberty despite the tensions that exist between these values. This Part applies the normative framework developed in Part I to assess recent developments in campaign finance regulation in the United States and Canada. I argue that in recent cases, perhaps in an effort to be consistent, the U.S. Supreme Court has veered too far in the libertarian direction while the Supreme Court of Canada has veered too far in the egalitarian direction. I argue that these recent developments are normatively undesirable. In addition, I propose a methodology for future cases that would allow for the conflict between liberty and equality to be instantiated in law.
A. The Libertarian Turn in the United States
The Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC marked a turn towards a more exclusively libertarian approach to freedom of speech. In Citizens United, a majority struck down provisions of BCRA that prevented corporations and unions from engaging in independent spending on electioneering communications. 71 As a result of this decision, corporations and unions are now free to make independent expenditures from their general treasury funds to support or oppose candidates for political office. On the face of it, the decision in Citizens United appeared to be a dramatic break from past practice. 72 In a significant move, the 70. Ibid. v FEC, 130 S Ct 876, 913 (2010) . 72. Although the Court had struck down expenditure limits for individuals in Buckley v Valeo, it did not touch the spending bans on corporations and unions. Citizens United, which was a nonprofit corporation, produced a film entitled "Hillary: The Movie" that it wished to release as Court majority narrowed its understanding of corruption. 73 The Court held that the only governmental interest strong enough to overcome First Amendment concerns is preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof as stated in Buckley v. Valeo. 74 In a departure from its earlier decision in McConnell, the Court found that access and influence do not amount to corruption. As Richard Hasen argues, the Court's new position is in tension with prior decisions which had justified contribution limits on a broader understanding of corruption.
Citizens United
75
In other respects, though, the Court's position on corporate speech rights did not amount to a drastic change. Michael Kang observes that in an earlier decision, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life II, 76 the Court had already limited governmental restrictions to those ads that could not be interpreted in any way other than as the functional equivalent of express advocacy. As Kang notes, all the decision did was to allow "corporations to be more explicit in their campaign advocacy."
77 Richard Briffault likewise observes that Citizens United was "less legally transformative for the legality of corporate spending than many observers assumed."
78 In a similar vein, Michael Dorf contends that the "regime of campaign finance regulation pre-Citizens United was so full of loopholes that adding this additional one did not materially alter it."
79
The Citizens United decision is momentous, however, for its emphatic rejection of the antidistortion (or equalization/egalitarian) justification. Specifically, the majority overturned Austin's holding that the government has an interest in preventing the distortion of the electoral system. According to Justice Kennedy, Austin's antidistortion rationale was an equalization rationale that was inconsistent with a central position in Buckley v. Valeo: "The concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 80 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens defended a version of the antidistortion rationale, but he claimed that his argument was not about equalization. Instead, he argued that the antidistortion rationale was "simply a variant on the classic governmental interest in protecting against improper influences on officeholders a "video on demand" through a digital cable provider. The release of this documentary would have violated BCRA section 203 which prevented corporations and unions from making independent expenditures from their general treasury funds to support or oppose a candidate. Citizens United wished to pay the cable fee from its general treasury funds. Although the documentary contained no express advocacy, the FEC found that the video was the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Dawood that debilitate the democratic process."
81 As Richard Hasen observes, Justice Stevens nonetheless used the language of equalization in various passages. 82 For example, he contended that the "corporate domination of the airwaves prior to an election may decrease the average listener's exposure to relevant viewpoints, and it may diminish citizens' willingness and capacity to participate in the democratic process."
83 As Kathleen Sullivan notes, the majority and dissent in the Citizens United decision closely track the libertarian and egalitarian approaches.
84 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion articulates the libertarian position while Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion articulates the egalitarian position. Sullivan concludes that the holding in Citizens United is "best explained as representing a triumph of the libertarian over the egalitarian vision of free speech."
85
The Court's rejection of the antidistortion rationale has weighted the scales definitively in favour of liberty. In so doing, the Court has attracted considerable criticism.
86 Daniel Tokaji argues, for instance, that the "real problem with Citizens United is its emphatic rejection of political equality as a countervailing value that may be used to justify limitation on campaign spending." 87 Richard Hasen contends that the antidistortion argument "did not deserve to be orphaned, and remains… a key animating principle in thinking about the desirability of campaign finance laws."
88 Richard Briffault observes that the "most important constitutional value the Court has rejected is, of course, voter equality, which is a central premise of our democratic system." 89 The normative status of equality is diminished whenever a jurisdiction moves too far in the direction of protecting liberty. The U.S. Supreme Court's recent approach reflects the binary "either/or" approach to the conflict between liberty and equality. The drive for consistency across the caselaw has meant, paradoxically, that the jurisprudence was purged of the very tensions that allowed for the values of liberty and equality to co-exist.
81. Ibid at 970. 82. Hasen, supra note 73 at 598-99. Kathleen Sullivan also argues that although Justice Stevens' dissent avoids the language of equalization, his discussion of the rationale reveals an egalitarian impulse. Kathleen M Sullivan, "Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech" (2010) 124 Harv L Rev 143 at 148. 83. Citizens United, supra note 71 at 975-76. 84. Sullivan, supra note 82 at 145. Sullivan's two categories-free speech as liberty and free speech as equality-are the same as the conventional "libertarian" and "egalitarian" approaches to free speech. 85. Ibid. 86. James Gardner argues that the Court has adopted an extreme "anti-regulatory absolutism" that bars all regulation. James A Gardner, "Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the Implied Slippery Slope" (2011) 
B. The Egalitarian Turn in Canada
It is rare that we have grounds to lament too much equality, but in recent decisions the Supreme Court of Canada has privileged equality to the significant detriment of liberty interests. In particular, the Court's decision in Harper v. Canada (A.G.) ushered in a new approach to equality, one that was reinforced in the Court's subsequent decision in R v. Bryan.
In Harper, a six-member majority of the Court upheld the constitutionality of limitations on third party spending. 90 The Court majority affirmed its commitment to the egalitarian model of elections, under which wealth is the main obstacle that prevents individuals from enjoying an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process. 91 The egalitarian model is "premised on the notion that individuals should have an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process."
92 The Court noted in addition that "the egalitarian model promotes an electoral process that requires the wealthy to be prevented from controlling the electoral process to the detriment of others with less economic power."
93 Spending limits are thus required to prevent the most affluent citizens from monopolizing electoral discourse and thereby preventing other citizens from participating on an equal basis. The Court found that Parliament's third party spending rules were "clearly structured on the egalitarian model of elections" because their objective is to "promote electoral fairness by creating equality in the political discourse." 94 Not only do spending limits protect voters, they also ensure that candidates and parties have equal opportunities to communicate their positions. The Court held that although the spending limits infringed upon the freedoms of expression and association guaranteed by the Charter, 95 the provisions were nonetheless justifiable under section 1.
96
Although the Court majority was attentive to the importance of equality, it arguably did not grant sufficient attention to free speech liberties. The spending limits were set so low that citizens could not advertise through the national media.
97
At most, citizens could place ads in local papers, print some flyers, and distribute these flyers by hand. 98 In addition, the spending limits imposed on citizens were significantly lower than those imposed on candidates and parties; indeed, citizens are permitted to spend only 1.3 percent of the national advertising spending limits for political parties. 99 In their dissenting opinion, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major argued that the spending limits imposed a "virtual ban" on citizens who wished to participate in the political deliberation during the election 90. Harper v Canada, 2004 SCC 33 [Harper] period. 100 For all intents and purposes, the only individuals and groups that could engage in political discussion during an election period were candidates and political parties.
101 Rather than equalizing speaking power, the regulations appeared to shrink the pool of effective participants, and hence the diversity of viewpoints in the marketplace of ideas. The dissenting justices concluded that this "denial of effective communication to citizens violates free expression where it warrants the greatest protection-the sphere of political discourse."
102
The Court's commitment to equality at the expense of liberty was also evident in a subsequent case, R. v. Bryan. 103 The case concerned the constitutionality of a provision of the Canada Elections Act which prohibited the transmission of election results between electoral ridings before the closing of all polling stations in Canada. The claimant had posted election results from Atlantic Canada on a website while polls were still open in other electoral ridings.
104 A 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court held that although the provision infringed the freedom of expression as protected by section 2(b), it could nonetheless be upheld under section 1. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Abella concluded that the publication ban was an "excessive response to an insufficiently proven harm."
105
Although the ban was only for a few hours on election day, the decision itself sets a precedent for future cases involving the suppression of electoral speech. In the decision for the majority, Justice Bastarache placed great emphasis on the government's objective of ensuring "informational equality" to justify the ban. According to the Court, informational equality is a problem because it creates a perception of unfairness that some voters have access to information that is not available to other voters, and, in addition, that these voters might change their behaviour on account of the information. 106 Although the Court described informational equality as a "centrally important element of the concept of electoral fairness,"
107 it did not wrestle with the difficulty that information is always, if not inevitably, unevenly distributed in society. The Court has now set the stage for the future regulation of electoral speech based upon this new principle of informational equality. Taken to its logical extreme, the principle of informational equality could result in the significant suppression of electoral speech.
The Supreme Court of Canada's recent position is arguably too egalitarian. The Court is subordinating liberties of speech even when it is unclear that the legislative restrictions are essential for electoral fairness. Jamie Cameron argues, for instance, that the Court in the Harper case "resisted 2(b) values, as well as the evidentiary requirements of section 1, to uphold provisions that effectively exclude citizens from the democratic process. Bryan decision, Christopher Bredt and Margot Finlay criticize the emphasis given by the Court to the goal of informational equality. 109 They argue that the freedom of expression should supersede the "putative inherently important goal of informational equality" 110 because the former is a "right explicitly guaranteed in the Charter while the [latter] is a principle the value of which is not at all clear, and certainly not from the evidence before the Court."
111
In addition, an over-emphasis on equality leads to other possible harms. One difficulty with spending limits is that they usually benefit incumbent politicians by reducing the likelihood of success by challengers. 112 Incumbent politicians often support spending limits for this self-serving reason, even though such limits are publicly defended on the ground that they equalize the electoral playing field. As such, the majority decision in Harper has been criticized for failing to attend to the potential problem of self-dealing by elected officials. 113 For this reason, as I have argued elsewhere, the Court should treat electoral laws with a certain amount of skepticism. 114 I claim, in addition, that the Supreme Court's principal role is to ensure the fairness of the democratic process, and to do so, the Court must be attentive to the propensity of elected officials to enact laws that perpetuate their own power.
115 Although the value of equality is a necessary component in the regulation of electoral speech, it should not be seen as the preeminent value.
C. Instantiating the Conflict in Law
The recent approaches by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, respectively, have privileged one value-liberty or equality-at the expense of the other. Both of these approaches are detrimental to democratic participation and governance. Too great an emphasis on equality can lead to an impairment of free speech liberties of citizens, while too great an emphasis on liberty can lead to vast spending by powerful groups on electoral advertising. For these reasons, this article has argued that the law that governs electoral speech should simultaneously instantiate the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tensions between them.
Although each jurisdiction would have its own method for instantiating the conflict between liberty and equality in law, it is possible to propose preliminary steps for how this could be done, at least at an abstract, conceptual level. As a start, the decision to regulate electoral speech should be reframed as inevitably entailing a trade-off between liberty and equality. Rather than emphasizing either liberty or equality, a jurisdiction should instead pay more attention to the tradeoff that occurs between liberty and equality. To achieve these tradeoffs, courts and legislatures should consider the extent to which campaign finance regulations protect both liberty and equality interests.
Given the difficulty of this tradeoff, it is helpful to identify those goods that are associated with the libertarian and egalitarian approaches, respectively. I suggest that the "liberty goods" include the following: the ability to contest the government through speech; the ability to contest those in power electorally by challenging incumbents; the ability to hold the government accountable; and the protection of the marketplace of ideas. I claim that "equality goods" include the following: preventing the translation of wealth into political influence; preventing the wealthy from dominating the electoral debate; preventing the appearance or reality of corruption; allowing multiple perspectives to be heard; and establishing a level playing field among non-politicians.
In an ideal system, the role of the legislature would be to devise legislation that protects both liberty goods and equality goods. The role of the courts would be to assess whether the legislature has achieved a reasonable trade-off between the liberty interests and the equality interests. Although it would be impossible to provide maximal protection to the liberty and equality goods, the idea would be to achieve an optimal protection of these interests. That is, the campaign finance regulations should be crafted in such a way that they do not overly constrain the ability of citizens to criticize the government, or the ability of challengers to compete effectively against incumbents, or the ability of citizens and private entities to participate in electoral speech, or the perception or reality of corruption. Not only would this approach allow for debate and discussion, it would also help to ensure that the specific content of the regulations is democracy-enhancing.
The Libman case discussed in Part II above is a good example of how a court can instantiate the conflict between liberty and equality in law. In Libman, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the third party spending regulations on the basis that they impermissibly infringed the freedom of expression. At the same time, the Court endorsed an egalitarian model of elections under which spending limits could be permitted in order to level the playing field. In so doing, the Court recognized both the values of equality and liberty without resolving the tension between them. The approach proposed here is that the Court can defer to Parliament's general conclusion that spending limits are required, but it should also subject the actual limits to more searching scrutiny to ensure that liberty goods are also protected.
The earlier caselaw in the United States also instantiated the conflict between liberty and equality, albeit in a somewhat disguised way. The antidistortion theory provided greater room for jurisdictions to impose spending limits on corporate speech. In future cases, the U.S. Supreme Court should return to a broader understanding of corruption as including undue influence, in addition to revitalizing the antidistortion rationale. One lesson that can be drawn from these examples is that when the conflict between liberty and equality is instantiated in law, we should expect to see inconsistencies or tensions in the jurisprudence. I claim that these tensions should not be treated as flaws in the doctrine, but instead should be viewed as allowing for the conflict between liberty and equality to be instantiated in law.
Conclusion
This article has developed a new normative framework for the constitutional treatment of electoral speech, and it has done so by revisiting the conventional distinction between the egalitarian approach and libertarian approach to campaign finance regulation. I have argued, first, that although the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is usually treated as a binary choice, the constitutional law of a given jurisdiction can display both libertarian and egalitarian characteristics. I therefore argue for the concept of an "libertarian-egalitarian spectrum" in which ideal versions of each approach serve as the endpoints while points along the spectrum represent particular combinations of these two approaches. I show how earlier caselaw in the United States and Canada contained elements of both the libertarian and egalitarian approaches.
Second, I have claimed that a democracy should seek to incorporate both the values of equality and liberty within campaign finance law. Instead of emphasizing one value over the other, the ideal position is one that simultaneously recognizes the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tensions between them. Indeed, I argued that the conflict between liberty and equality cannot and should not be reconciled; instead, it is vital to maintain this tension by instantiating the conflict in law. I also showed how this approach stands in contrast to the approaches in the literature-most notably those proposed by Owen Fiss and Ronald Dworkin, respectively-that seek to reconcile the tension between liberty and equality by transforming one value into an aspect of the other. In contrast to Fiss and Dworkin, I claimed that there is substantial democratic value to retaining and rendering transparent the irreconcilable tension between liberty and equality. In addition to shedding light on the recent approaches of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, this normative framework also points the way to future approaches to the regulation of campaign finance law. Courts and legislatures should seek to incorporate the values of liberty and equality in the rules that govern electoral speech despite the irreconcilable conflict that exists between these fundamental values.
